Illinois Constitutional Convention

The November 4 election will attract a great deal of interest in Illinois this year, in large part due to the presence of the state's junior senator, Barack Obama, on the presidential ballot.

But the ballot item with the greatest potential to transform Illinois politics for generations to come may be a statewide referendum on whether to call a state constitutional convention.

The current Illinois constitution, approved in 1970, requires state residents to vote every 20 years on whether to call a new constitutional convention or "con-con". If a con-con is approved by 60 percent or more of those voting on that question, or by a majority of voters casting ballots in that election, convention delegates will be popularly elected on a non-partisan basis at a special election in 2009.

The new constitution, along with any separately proposed provisions or amendments, must then be approved by at least 60 percent of voters in another statewide referendum before it can take effect.

At the first 20-year referendum in 1988, Illinois residents were relatively content with the state of their government and voted 3-1 against a con-con.

Today discontent, if not outright disgust, with state government seems to be at an historic high. Democratic Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich, who narrowly won reelection to a second term in 2006, is now the most unpopular governor in the entire nation, with an approval rating of only 13 percent. Many legislators, past officeholders, and ordinary citizens assert that he has abused various provisions of the current constitution, such as amendatory veto power and the authority to call special legislative sessions.

Other provisions of the current constitution seem to have contributed to a situation in which leaders of the dominant party in each chamber (House and Senate) have nearly total control over what measures can be voted on. Add to that a political culture dominated by the rough-and-tumble municipal politics of Chicago (more than half the state's population lives in Chicago or its suburbs), with a long tradition of trading political donations or favors for governmental patronage jobs, and no limits on donations to any candidate or officeholder.

The result is a strong conviction among state citizens that its system of government is "broken." The question facing Illinois voters is whether a constitutional convention will fix what's "broken" about state government, or "break" provisions that do not need fixing.

Advocates of an Illinois con-con argue that it will provide the best, if not the only, chance for citizens to force consideration of reforms such as:

-- Term limits and/or recall votes. There is no limit on how many times governors, other statewide officers, state representatives or senators can run for re-election, and no provision for removing an officeholder before his or her term expires unless he or she is convicted of a felony. Con-con advocate John Bambenek states that "far too many politicians rule 'for life' without any real means for the voters to make them responsive to their needs."

-- Clarifying or limiting the authority of the governor to call special sessions. Blagojevich has called more than 40 special sessions since taking office in 2003, more than all of his predecessors under the 1970 constitution combined. Most have not resulted in any legislative action.

-- Graduated income tax rates (the current constitution mandates flat rates for all individuals and corporations regardless of income).

-- A stronger mandate for the state, rather than local property tax payers, to bear the majority of the cost of public education. Illinois schools' dependence on local property taxes has led to large funding disparities between wealthy suburban school districts and poor urban or rural districts.

-- Limits on the governor's amendatory veto power. The current constitution allows the governor to veto entire bills, remove or reduce line items in appropriation bills, or make changes in the wording of any bill. Legislators must then decide whether to accept the governor's changes, muster enough votes to override them, or allow the entire bill to die. Blagojevich has used this power to effectively rewrite entire bills against the wishes of the General Assembly.

-- Changes in the redistricting process which follows each federal census. The 1970 constitution provides for revised Congressional and legislative districts to be drawn up by an 8-member commission evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. If they cannot agree on a map (and they never have) a ninth member is chosen by random drawing. The result, inevitably, is a map designed by the political party with whom the tiebreaking member is affiliated. District boundaries are in some cases wildly gerrymandered to insure the dominance of a particular party.

"There are disturbingly few uncompetitive races throughout the state," Bambenek writes. "Democrats have their seats, Republicans have theirs and often they do not even try to compete for the other party's turf. Politicians should not be able to choose their voters; it should be the other way around."

Meanwhile, opponents of a con-con argue that the same people and interests that dominate state government now will take over any constitutional convention -- using their money and influence to insure that only delegates sympathetic to their interests get elected -- and use the opportunity to entrench their abusive practices more deeply.

A coalition of unions, business and civic groups has launched a campaign urging voters to vote "no" on the con-con issue. The Alliance to Protect the Illinois Constitution argues that the 1970 constitution is one of the "most forward-thinking and citizen-friendly" such documents in the nation and should not be altered to suit the interests of "single-issue and special interest groups."

Arguments raised by this group and others against a con-con include:

-- Potential cost. The 1970 convention lasted nine months and cost more than $14 million, equivalent to more than $80 million today. The expense is difficult to justify when the state is closing parks and other facilities and making severe program cuts because of budget shortfalls.

-- Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the pensions of current state employees and retirees could be scrapped in an attempt to relieve the state of a looming future financial burden caused, in large part, by intentional under-funding of the pension systems.

-- Special interest groups may use the convention as a platform to battle over hot-button issues such as same-sex marriage, gun control, abortion and the death penalty. The death penalty was an issue during the 1970 convention, and an amendment that would have abolished it was submitted to voters separately from the main constitution. It was rejected. (A new con-con could also allow a separate vote on the most controversial measures so as not to imperil the entire document.)

Con-con proponents counter that the most entrenched special interests are opposed to a new constitution because it may threaten their "clout" or ability to influence state government. Columnist Kristen McQueary writes that "a constitutional convention is one of very few tools Illinois voters can employ to be heard. Why do you think the political establishment only allows us to do it every 20 years?"

-- The time and effort devoted to a con-con would distract officeholders and the public from more urgent public needs such as education, transportation and healthcare. But con-con backers argue that urgent public needs have been neglected for years anyway and a convention could not make the situation any worse.

-- A con-con would "create an atmosphere of uncertainty" that would discourage businesses from coming to or remaining in the state, since they would not know what kind of tax or regulation structure they would face in the future.

-- State government's lack of action is not the fault of the "system", but of the people currently in office. The solution is to vote for the right people, not change a basically sound system.

Con-con opponents note that the current constitution already has provisions for the public to initiate amendments. Such amendments may only concern "structural and procedural subjects" contained in Article IV (Legislature). Several such amendments have been passed, including one that reduced the number of seats in the Illinois House by one-third in 1980.

However, the public cannot initiate amendments affecting the governor or other executive branch officials, or the judicial branch. Only the General Assembly, by a three-fifths vote in both houses, may place such amendments on the ballot.

Con-con supporters note that legislators also have little if any incentive to advance amendments that curb their authority, such as term limits. They may also hesitate to advance amendments that limit the power of the governor for fear he will retaliate against them (e.g. by vetoing funds for projects in their districts, or attempting to close or move state facilities in their districts).

Ultimately, both sides agree that Illinois is in desperate need of drastic reform measures. What they do not agree on is whether a rewrite of the state constitution will result in a healthier political process or prove to be a cure worse than the disease.