A 58 page annex to the final report describes what the Commission was able to learn about the BW program, despite Iraq's concealment activities, and documents discrepancies between what Iraq claimed to have developed, or destroyed, and the physical evidence. Some of the findings include:
Extensive BW program: Iraq had an extensive BW program from 1973 until at least 1991. In mid-1995, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents, but claimed that the entire BW program had been in "obliterated" in 1991 and that all BW weapons had been destroyed and all bulk BW agents had been deactivated. The Commission found, however, that the evidence produced in support of this claim was not credible, and that Iraq "retained suitable growth media, BW facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel, and the essential technical knowledge" after 1991.
Bulk production: In July, 1995, Iraq acknowledged that between 1988 and 1991, it had produced two BW agents in bulk: botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax). Iraq reported 19,180 liters of botulinum toxin (10-20 fold concentrated) and 8445 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores (10 fold concentrated).
UNSCOM found, however, that "bulk warfare agent production appears to be considerably understated," given the resources available to Iraq's BW program, including growth media and fermenter capacity. The Commission said that the production rate of Botulinum toxin could be as much as double the stated amount, and 3 times greater than that stated for Bacillus anthracis spores.
Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed more than 7500 liters of the Botulinum toxin and 3412 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores in 1991; UNSCOM noted that there was not evidence to support quantities claimed to be destroyed. The report concludes "the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed... and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq."
Iraq also claims to have produced lesser quantities of clostridium perfringens spores, ricin, and wheat cover smut.
BW Warheads: Iraq claimed to have produced 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads and filled them with BW agents. The Commission found that there was no credible evidence to show that only 25 missiles were produced and filled. Iraq declared that the 25 missiles were unilaterally destroyed; the Commission found enough physical evidence to account for the declared quantities of BW warheads, but the location of the remnants were inconsistent with Iraq's story.
BW bombs: Iraq declared that 200 R-400 aerial bombs were manufactured for BW purposes, but acknowledged that the numbers of bombs filled with particular agents (100 with botulinum toxin, 50 with bacillus anthracis spores, and 7 with aflatoxin) were "guesses." UNSCOM did find evidence of the destruction of some BW bombs at the site declared by Iraq, but found that the remnants account for less than one third of the bombs Iraq claims to have destroyed. In addition, UNSCOM found evidence of R-400A bombs carrying BW at an airfield where no BW weapons were declared.
Aircraft drop tanks: Iraq claimed that it produced 4 aircraft drop tanks to disseminate BW agents, and was developing a pilotless aircraft that could carry the tanks, holding either BW or chemical weapons, and release the toxins at a preset time. UNSCOM found that there was no evidence corroborate that only 4 were produced, and noted that interviews indicated that 12 were planned. Remnants of only three destroyed tanks were recovered. UNSCOM also rejected the evidence offered by Iraq--a letter thanking the project workers--that the pilotless aircraft project was shut down.
Aerosol Generators: Iraq developed aerosol generators for the dispersal of BW agents by modifying helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide disseminators. Although Iraq claimed the devices were ineffective, UNSCOM received documentation that they were successfully field tested. Interview evidence suggests that there were 12 devices produced; none were destroyed by UNSCOM.
Remaining Bacterial Growth Media: UNSCOM determined that there remained substantial bacterial growth media imported into Iraq which remains unaccounted for: 460 kg. of casien; 80 kg. of thioglocollate broth; 520 kg. of yeast extract; and 1100 kg of peptone. The report says that "the amounts that are 'missing' are significant, and would be sufficient to produce quantities of agent comparable to that already declared by Iraq."
UNSCOM was more successful in its pursuit of Iraq's CW program largely because Iraq was more cooperative with its disclosures. The final report notes that a "significant number" of chemical weapons, their components, and related equipment were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision between 1991 and 1997. In addition, the report found:
Extensive CW program: Iraq acknowledged that it carried out a large scale CW program between 1982 and 1990. It claims that more than 50% of its chemical weapons stocks were consumed during the 1980s, and that the majority of its production facilities were destroyed by aerial bombing during the Gulf War.
Bulk CW agents: Iraq said that it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents during the entire implementation of its CW program, and that 3,315 tons of these agents were weaponized. Agents produced in large quantities included mustard, tabun, and sarin.
According to Iraq, 80% of the weaponized CW agents were consumed between 1982 and 1988. In addition, they claim to have unilaterally discarded 130 tons of non-weaponized CW agents during the 1980s. UNSCOM found that these numbers could not be verified.
After the Gulf War, Iraq claimed that it had 412.5 tons of CW agents remaining. Four hundred eleven tons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision; 1.5 tons of the CW agent VX remain unaccounted for.
Special Munitions: Iraq claimed that between 1982 and 1988, 100,000 munitions filled with CW agents were consumed or disposed of. UNSCOM found that this number could not be verified.
After the Gulf war, Iraq declared that there remained over 56,000 special munitions which could carry either CW or BW agents (22,000 filled, 34,000 unfilled). These munitions are all accounted for. They were either destroyed or converted for conventional weapons purposes.
Iraq claimed that there were 42,000 special munitions destroyed in the Gulf War. UNSCOM was unable to verify that number, and found that the destruction of 2,000 unfilled munitions remains uncertain, and 550 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.
Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed 29,000 special munitions; UNSCOM found that of these, 100 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.
More reading, check out these links.
UNSCOM Final Report to the Security Council (January 25, 1999)IAEA Fact Sheet on Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program
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