Soldier4Christ
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« Reply #15 on: February 17, 2008, 03:00:50 PM » |
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As mentioned earlier, the trial court determined the parties' signatures on the Arbitration Agreement were authentic. Appellants were not required to offer additional evidence in order for the trial court to make a ruling regarding the validity of the Agreement. See Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 269. Applying contract construction principles, we must review the entire Arbitration Agreement to determine whether it is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. An examination of the document reveals:
* "[the parties] agree to submit all claims and disputes among them to arbitration. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
* "The Parties agree to arbitrate all existing issues among them in the above mentioned Cause Numbers in the appropriate District Court, which includes the Divorce Case, the child custody of the [sic] Noor Qaddura and Farah Qaddura, the determination of each party's responsibilities and duties according to the Islamic rules of law. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
* The Arbitration Agreement lists with specificity the exact cause numbers, case styles, and names of the trial courts in which the three causes that are subject to the Agreement are pending. * The document states that the parties agree the ruling of the arbitration panel is "Binding, and Final, and no party will take any appeal or future legal action of any matter afterwards."
* The Arbitration Agreement concludes with the recitation that each party will cause the above cause numbers to be abated pending the decision of the arbitrators, and will ask the courts to refer the cases for arbitration within seven days from the establishment of the panel of arbitrators. Further, "[t]he assignment must include ALL cases, including those filed against or on behalf of other family members related to the parties."
The Arbitration Agreement does not contain any language purporting to except the applicability of the Agreement to certain issues, causes of action, or claims between the parties.
Jamal asserts that the issues disposed of by the partial summary judgment were no longer "existing issues" at the time the Arbitration Agreement was signed; therefore, the Agreement does not encompass these matters. A summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court. City of Beaumont v. Guillory, 751 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1988). It is proper for a trial court to reconsider and reverse its prior interlocutory ruling on a partial summary judgment. Elder Const., Inc. v. City of Colleyville, 839 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tex. 1992), citing Cunningham v. Eastham, 465 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accordingly, the partial summary judgment in this case was interlocutory and subject to being reconsidered and set aside by the trial court. The trial court could elect to re-examine the evidence on which the partial summary judgment was based and could subsequently conclude that it does not support the judgment. See Cunningham, 465 S.W.2d at 192. Therefore, the issues addressed in the partial summary judgment were not finally disposed of and remained pending between the parties at the time the Arbitration Agreement was signed.
Additionally, an examination of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the Arbitration Agreement reveals that although the partial summary judgment had been granted on several issues,(9) the parties' pleadings still sought considerable relief:
The divorce case:
Rola and Jamal: Each wants to be appointed sole managing conservator of the two children, with the possessory conservator ordered to pay child support. Each requests the court divide the parties' community property -- Rola seeks a disproportionate share for herself, Jamal states he wants a just and right distribution. Rola wants Jamal to pay her attorney's fees.
In his counterclaim, Jamal alleges a separate cause of action against Rola for "defamation and false light," in which he seeks $250,000 actual damages and $1,000,000 exemplary damages.
Rola and Osama: Rola seeks reimbursement for all community funds tendered to Osama by Jamal, whether in the form of a business or in community assets or in cash.
In his counterclaim, Osama seeks attorney's fees from Rola or from the community estate of Rola and Jamal.
The protective order case:
Jamal filed an application for a protective order pursuant to section 81.001 of the Texas Family Code, seeking to protect his two children from their maternal grandparents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 81.001 (Vernon 2002). The court master held a hearing on the application and denied it on February 27, 2002; Jamal was ordered to pay the grandparents' attorney $3,350 in attorney's fees. The next day, Jamal filed a notice of appeal from the master's recommendation. The record before us does not contain any further orders or judgments in this case.
As evidenced by a review of the issues that have yet to be addressed by the trial court in these two cases, the parties still had much to resolve on the date the Arbitration Agreement was signed.
Applying the pertinent rules of contract construction, we conclude the Arbitration Agreement is worded so that it can be given only one certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, and it is therefore not ambiguous. We hold that as a matter of law the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement expresses the intent of the parties that the scope of the Agreement include all claims raised by the parties' pleadings in the two cases before us up until September 25, 2002, the date the Agreement was signed by the parties. The scope of the Arbitration Agreement therefore includes all claims and matters previously ruled upon by the trial judge in the partial summary judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the Arbitration Agreement to be invalid and in denying Appellants' motions to stay litigation and compel arbitration under the Texas General Arbitration Act. We sustain Appellants' first and third issues.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's orders denying Appellants' motions to stay litigation and to compel arbitration in these two consolidated cases. We render judgment that the Arbitration Agreement signed by the parties is valid and enforceable and covers all disputes between the parties that arose prior to the date the parties signed the Arbitration Agreement, including all matters that were the subject of the partial summary judgment previously granted by the trial court.
DIXON W. HOLMAN JUSTICE
PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; DAY and HOLMAN, JJ.
DELIVERED: May 8, 2003
1. Cause No. 76-184050-00 is not part of these consolidated appeals and is not pending before this court.
2. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.021, 171.025 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
3. Osama did not attend the hearing. His attorney informed the court that the attorney was not present when the two arbitration documents were signed, he did not sign the documents on behalf of his client, and he could not agree that the signature on the documents belonged to his client. The court, however, determined the signature belonged to Osama.
4. Appellants' attorney stated that after she became involved in the case she filed a motion to set aside the partial summary judgment.
5. Osama's attorney attempted to persuade the trial court to sever the partial summary judgment from the remainder of the case so the judgment in favor of his client could be final. The court denied the motion to sever.
6. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.1 ("The trial court need not, but may--within 30 days after the order is signed--file findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
7. The divorce suit is appeal no. 2-02-416-CV; the protective order suit is appeal no. 2-02-415-CV. This court previously granted Appellants' motion to consolidate the two suits for purposes of appeal.
8. Appellee Osama is proceeding pro se on appeal and has not filed an appellee's brief.
9. The court held the Islamic Marriage Certificate was unenforceable, the house on Gladstone Drive is the separate property of Jamal, the house on Vesta Via Court belongs to Osama, and two certificates of deposit were never the community property of Rola and Jamal and belong solely to Osama.
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