Rusting Hulls for the Navy
United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) was established by the RF government in June and will be registered in St. Petersburg shortly. The USC is expected to be headed by Alexander Buturin, a presidential advisor on military-technical policy.
According to Buturin, in the next eight to 10 years, the state will invest about 170 billion rubles ($6.5 bln) in the modernization of shipyards. But these funds will be distributed rather unevenly. Under the Civilian Shipbuilding Development program, 140 billion rubles ($5.3 bln) will be earmarked. Government experts believe that military shipyards suffered less during the 1990s crisis so they will only receive about 30 billion rubles ($1.2 bln) by 2015 as part of the Military-Industrial Complex Development program.
But can Russian military shipbuilding develop dynamically with such modest support? In an interview with The Moscow News, Mikhail Barabanov, an expert with the Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, addresses these questions.
MN: How would you assess the present situation in the Russian military shipbuilding industry?
Barabanov: It is a rather mixed picture. On the one hand, in the past few years, the Navy leadership has developed a fairly coherent shipbuilding program. New shipbuilding projects have been launched, including Project 955 Yury Dolgoruky-class nuclear powered submarines, Project 20380 Steregushchy-class corvettes, and Project 21630 Astrakhan-class small artillery ships.
Work is in progress to complete projects that were launched back during the Yeltsin or even the Soviet era and were stalled for long periods. In all, since 2001, construction has started on 30 new warships, boats and auxiliary vessels. This is lifting the St. Petersburg-based Northern Shipyard and the Severodvinsk Machine-Building Enterprise [a shipyard that makes nuclear-powered submarines.- Ed.] from the doldrums.
On the other hand, funding for the ongoing projects is evidently insufficient. The deadlines for completion of the majority of ships, whose construction was launched in recent years, have been extended beyond 2010.
There are at least another two imbalances. The first is a bias in favor of new warships at the expense of existing ones, especially their maintenance. As a result, the available fleet is getting rusty, while all the money is being funneled into ongoing construction projects, but no one knows exactly when they will be ready; furthermore, in the majority of cases, we do not have appropriate weapon systems to fit them out with.
The second problem is that a disproportionate volume of funding that is being sunk into strategic nuclear forces at the expense of general purpose forces.
MN: What measures do you believe should be taken to rectify the situation?
Barabanov: I think that priority should be given to funding the maintenance, modernization and upgrading of the existing naval forces with a view to keeping these warships operational for another 20 to 30 years. Only this will enable us to preserve naval personnel and at the same time provide shipyards with enough orders to keep them afloat.
As for new warships, it is critical not to disperse resources, spreading them thin on the ground. The focus should be on building new-generation lead warships that can ensure a real breakthrough in naval development. And only when the financial situation really improves, embark on series production.
It seems that greater spending on military shipbuilding programs is inevitable. In 2007, 13 billion rubles ($520 million) was earmarked. We estimate that at least 30 bln rubles must be provided every year to complete the ongoing construction projects within a reasonable time frame.
MN: In April, the first fourth-generation Yury Dolgoruky- (Borey-) class nuclear powered missile carrying submarine was launched at the Severodvinsk shipyard. How do you assess this event?
Barabanov: Construction of such a sophisticated warship in such difficult economic conditions is, without a doubt, a major achievement of our military shipbuilding industry. Putting Project 955 warships into service and arming them with the advanced Bulava missiles will considerably strengthen Russia's defense capability.
At the same time, amid the meager funding for the Navy as a whole, construction of Project 955 submarines leaves little or nothing for the Navy's technical equipment programs. Thus, of 13 billion rubles earmarked this year for new warships, 10 billion will go to submarines, with almost the entire amount due to be spent on three Project 955 missile carrying submarines. This includes almost 5 billion rubles that will be spent on the Yury Dolgoruky's testing and fine-tuning. To compare: a mere 200 million rubles was allocated this year for construction of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, with an estimated price tag of 11 billion rubles.
The state should make a more realistic assessment of the viability of the ambitious program of building and maintaining a major nuclear-powered submarine fleet. In effect, Russia wants to have 14 missile carrying submarines (including six Project 667BDRM upgrades) - which is as many the U.S., whilst the U.S. Navy's 2007 budget is 50 times as large as Russia's! Furthermore, at present, the U.S. is not building a single nuclear powered missile carrying submarine, planning to start replacing its Ohio class submarines only from 2026.
MN: Meanwhile, substantial naval assets are required to provide cover and support for nuclear powered missile carrying submarines.
Barabanov: That's right. But this year's funding for construction of new surface warships is just one-third of funding for missile carrying submarines, while existing surface warships continue to be decommissioned. With such an imbalance, Russia will be simply unable to have sufficient forces to ensure the deployment, cover and support of the planned number of nuclear powered missile carrying submarines. However, general-purpose forces also have other important missions to perform - for example, protection and control of the shelf zone, where the main hydrocarbon deposits are concentrated.
MN: The RF Navy command recently announced plans to build aircraft carriers. How viable are these plans?
Barabanov: R&D work is this area is absolutely necessary, to lay a foundation for the future. But today, the Navy is not even in a position to ensure the normal maintenance and operation of our only aircraft carrier, The Admiral Kuznetsov. I believe that The Kuznetsov and its air group should be given higher priority. Taking into account the real condition of the Russian Navy and the Russian economy in the next 20 years, construction of aircraft carriers will be an unbearable burden.
MN: About 40 percent of Russia's warship building capacities are concentrated in St. Petersburg. Even before the decision was made to create the USC, plans were announced for restructuring St. Petersburg's shipbuilding industry, including the de facto closure of the Baltic Shipyard and the transfer of its capacities to the Northern Shipyard. Is this not a risky move?
Barabanov: No, I suppose that it is a natural process. In a free market economy, the existence of a large shipyard at the very heart of a megalopolis is an anachronism. So the closure of the Baltic Shipyard is inevitable. It is necessary to build new modern shipyards in more suitable areas, or to expand and develop existing shipyards, such as the Northern Shipyard. I believe that it will be followed by another St. Petersburg giant - the Admiralty Shipyard.
Rusting Hulls for the Navy